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count the researchers rank with respect to the academic resume can induce
a larger number of researchers to overtake a minimal production standard.
It thus appears as superior to piecework remuneration.
Keywords : Mean Field Game, Academic production, incentives, Lotka’s
law.
JEL Classification : C72, I23, O31
1 Introduction
Over the last twenty years, academic publications tend to become the gen-
eralized gauge of the academic performance. Would assessment be directly
grounded on the number of publications, on the number of citations or on
the impact factor of the journals, all bibliometric criteria give a dramatic
role to the characteristics of scientific productions in the evaluation of indi-
vidual researchers (Groot and Garcia-Valderrama, 2006, Bence and Oppen-
heim 2004). In return these publications play an increasing role in setting
individual salaries and promotions (Hamermesh et al 1982).1
A vast strand of research deals with the influence of the academic re-
sume on the researchers’ careers and rewards. For instance, Stephan (1996)
emphasizes that any publication contributes to the researcher’s social recog-
nition which is a main part of the academic reward. Diamond (1986) shows
that the marginal worth of a citation may vary between 50 and 1300 dollars.
In a same way, Swidler and Goldreyer (1998) state that the present value of
the first top finance journal article is between 19 493 and 33 754 dollars. In
France, since 2008, the jury of the ”Concours d’Agregation pour le recrute-
ment des professeurs d’universite” in charge of the recruitment of professors
1Boyes et al. (1984) emphasizes that research output is more important for promotion
than in-house activities like teaching or administrative tasks
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of economics is explicitly using a bibliometric evaluation rule based on the
number of publications and the quality of their support (as revealed by the
CNRS ranking) to assess applicants (Levy Garboua 2008, Ellison 2010).
Despite these major changes in the governance of the research system,
the distribution of the scientific production among the academic population
appears as an unchanging rule of the academic production pattern. Almost
one century ago, Lotka (1926), already highlighted the inverse relationship
between the number of scientific publications in an academic resume and the
number of authors that achieve such a CV. Dealing with the productivity
of researchers in chemistry and physics, the initial work of Lotka revealed
a statistical regularity whereby the majority of authors (60%) publish a
single contribution during their career while a small number contributes an
essential part of the total number of scientific contributions2.
Lotka’s law is regarded as one of the three pillars of contemporary scien-
tometrics3. Its validity has been the subject of numerous empirical verifica-
tions. An illustration of this law is given by Le Coadic (2005) to characterize
the production of French researchers in chemistry. It is also verified in Eco-
nomics (Cox and Chung, 1991), finance (Chung and Cox 1990), medicine
(Kawamura et al 1999)... The robustness of this law is also attested by sim-
ilar studies using other indexes: Combes and Linnemer (2001) focus on the
number of articles weighted by the quality of journals and Courtault et al
(2010, 2011) considered the distribution of the h index (Hirsch 2005). Both
found that these indexes are distributed according to Lotka’s law.4
In these settings, the aim of the present paper is to show that Lotka’s
distribution may be a persistent equilibrium distribution of the scientific
production in a game where the publication choices of researchers are made
under alternative regimes of incentives. In this purpose, we develop a highly
stylized mean field game in the line of Gue´ant, Lasry and Lions (2010) to
2Lotka’s law states that the number of authors making n publications is about 1/na of
those making one publication, where a is approximately equal to two. For example, the
number of researchers who have ten contributions represents one percent of the number
of researchers who have one publication only.
3the two other are Bradford’s law (on a specific topic, a limited number of journals
publish a large number of contributions and a large number of journals publish a limited
number of items) and Zipf’s law (if in a given text, words are ordered according to their
frequency, the product rank by frequency is approximately constant). It is easy to show
that all these laws are particular cases of Pareto’s law, i.e.: roughly 80% of the effects
comes from 20% of the causes (Cf. Egghe and Rousseau 1990, Newman 2005).
4This robustness of similar distribution has been shown in a larg number of fields
in economics and finance (income and wealth, the size of cities and firms, stock market
returns, trading volume, international trade etc...), Cf. Gabaix (2009)
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consider the optimal decision of a rational academic researcher interacting
with a continuum of other researchers.
Introduced by Lasry and Lions (2007), the Mean Field Games Theory
allows the study of strategic behavior when many agents are in a situation of
interaction. When the number of players is important (mainly when there is
a continuum of agents), one can hardly assume that a given player is able to
take into account all the other players interactions and to compute the Nash
equilibrium of a game. In this case, the Mean Field Game Theory adopts
the methodological approach of statistical physics in the modelization of
the interaction of a great number of particles. Faced to this insurmountable
computational problem, physicists consider each particle as being influenced
by a mean field exerted by all other particles while simultaneously taking
into account the influence of each particle on the mean field. In order to
formalize the behavior of a great number of rational agents, the Mean Field
Game Theory assumes each agent to be influenced by the mean field made of
the distribution of other players’ behavior and considers the consequences
of each individual decision on this mean field. In a mean field game, an
agent cannot directly influence other agents but each agent contributes to
the formation of a mean field which influences in turn the behavior of each
individual.
Developed in continuous time, this approach involves methods of stochas-
tic calculus and dynamic optimization. In a Mean Field Game, the dynamics
of the system is governed by two equations: a backward Hamilton-Jacobi-
Bellman equation describing the optimal behavior of agents given the distri-
bution of the other players and a forward Kolmogorov equation which takes
into account the influence of each player on the mean field. The fixed point
of those two equations gives the Nash equilibrium of the game : Lasry and
Lions proved that the coupled system, i.e. the backward HJB equation and
the forward Kolmogorov equation can be obtained as the asymptotic limit
of Nash equilibrium of N players as N goes to infinity.
It is important to note that the approach of mean field games is different
from what is done in standard games theory : the specific partial differential
equations system (forward/backward structure) studied in MFG theory is
new and does not appear in the literature before MFG, see for instance Khan
and Sun (2002) or Aumann (1964). Morover, one have to mention that the
forward/backward structure is a real difference between MFG theory and
econophysics where the anticipations process of agents is not sufficiently
taken into account.
In the paper at hand, we consider infinite living researchers who decide
at each point of time the level of their academic production taking into
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account the tradeoff between the cost of this production and the reward
that it provides. The equilibrium of such a game is computed for alternatives
compensation mechanisms. In particular, the game allows to show that the
Paretian distribution is a stable solution under merit pay. Finally, some
comparative statics allows to show that the fraction of academic researchers
having a publication score above a given threshold is an increasing function
of monetary incentive and a decreasing function of time preference.
In the line of Pareto (1896) and Allais (1974) who believed that economic
policy could not influence the distribution of income and wealth (supposed
to be independent even of the economic system), we found that economic
policy cannot change the distribution of the scientific production. However,
policy may influence both the speed at which this distribution moves and
its dispersion and proves to have an impact on the overall research output.
Section 2 presents the mean field game approach of academic behav-
ior both with and without externalities. Section 2.2, takes explicitly into
account the influence of ranking on the researchers’ remuneration. The
analysis of the effects of this externality in the reward system is the main
innovation of the paper. Section 3 interprets the economic meaningfulness
of the results. A last section concludes the paper.
2 A mean field game approach to academic behav-
ior)
Let at denote the instantaneous scientific production of a researcher at date
t and xt be the cumulative measure of this production at the same date.
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The relation between at and xt is given by :
dxt = atdt
Let there be a continuum of researchers. Define m(t, x) as the density
of the distribution of xt at date t. By assumption, the support of the dis-
tribution at date 0 is [1,∞), where we consider that the worst researcher at
date 0 is a newly mint PhD student with only his PhD Thesis. At date t,
the optimization problem of the researcher is given by :
U(t, x) = max
(as)
{∫ +∞
t
f(xs, as,m(s, xs))e
−r(s−t)ds/xt = x
}
(1)
5xt and at could represent the number of papers weighted by the quality of the scientific
reviews or any other bibliometric index.
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where f(xs, as,m(s, xs)) is the researcher’s instantaneous utility function
and r takes into account the researcher’s time preference. Below, we will
consider several specific expressions for the function f(., ., .).
If we suppose, for instance, that m is known the solution of this optimiza-
tion problem is given by the Hamilton-Jacobi-Belmann (HJB) equation6 :
∂U
∂t
(t, x) + max
a
{
f(x, a,m(t, x)) + a
∂U
∂x
}
− rU = 0 (2)
The control is given by a = argmax(f(x, a) + a∂U∂x ). Heuristically one can
obtain this equation using the dynamic programming principle of Bellman :
U(t, x) = max
(as)
{
f(x, at,m(t, x))dt+ e
−rdtU(t+ dt, x+ dxt)/xt = x
}
(3)
At time t=0, each researcher is endowed with an initial academic pro-
duction. Let m0 be the initial density of x0, the scientific production of the
researchers at time 0. m(t, ·) is the solution of Kolmogorov equation:
∂m
∂t
(t, x) +
∂
∂x
(a(t, x)m(t, x)) = 0 (4)
For the reader convenience, we give the formal derivation of this equation
which is also useful for the stochastic case. Let Φ be a smooth function with
compact support,∫
m(t+ dt, x)Φ(x)dx =
∫
m(t, x)Φ(x)dx+
∫
∂m
∂t
(t, x)Φ(x)dtdx
But m(t, x) is the density of the distribution of xt at date t, so∫
m(t+ dt, x)Φ(x)dx = E(Φ(xt+dt)) = E(Φ(xt) + Φ
′
(xt)dxt)
= E(Φ(xt) + Φ
′
(xt)atdt) =
∫
m(t, x)(Φ(x) + Φ
′
(x)atdt)dx
=
∫
(m(t, x)Φ(x)− ∂
∂x
(a(t, x)m(t, x))Φ(x)dt)dx
Hence ∫
∂m
∂t
(t, x)Φ(x)dtdx = −
∫
∂
∂x
(a(t, x)m(t, x))Φ(x)dt)dx
and this identity implies the Kolmogorov equation (Φ is a test function).
In order to get explicit solutions we have now to consider explicit forms
for f(., .).
6See for example Fleming anf Soner (2005) or Brock (1987)
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2.1 A model without externalities
In their research activities, researchers have to consider the trade-off be-
tween the cost of carrying out their research and the specific reward of total
and instantaneous scientific production (Swidler and Goldrayer 1998). This
trade off between costs and remuneration may be formalized as :
f(x, a) = αx+ βa− a2, (5)
where β is the instantaneous reward that a researcher gets from an addi-
tional publication. This reward incorporates both a monetary premium (as
in some scientific institutions such as business schools which pay researchers
for each new publication) and a psychological reward given by the mere fact
of being published by a selective journal (Stephan 1996).
α represents the reward that a researcher gets given his academic resume.
Once again this incorporates both monetary and social rewards. The cumu-
lative measure of scientific production is essential in determining promotions
and raises for scientific researchers (Diamond 1986, Stephan 1996). Beside,
the more an academic researcher publishes, the greater his readership and
the higher will be the influence of his work on the academic field.
The last term in the previous equation measures the research cost as-
sociated with an instantaneous production a. This cost is assumed to be
increasing at an increasing rate. For the sake of simplicity, we consider a
quadratic cost function.
In this section, we ignore the researchers interactions. The externalities
generated by the ranking of the academic researchers within in a field of
research will be dealt with Mean Field Game in subsection 2.
Althought we do not need to use the MFG equations for this model
without externalities, for the reader convenience, we revisit the solution of
the model via the MFG ”tools”. For a traditional exposition using calculus
of variation, see the appendix.
The control is given by a = argmax(f(x, a) + a∂U∂x ) =
1
2(
∂U
∂x
+ β). Repl-
cing in (2), we find
∂U
∂t
(t, x) + f(x,
1
2
(
∂U
∂x
+ β)) +
1
2
(
∂U
∂x
+ β)
∂U
∂x
− rU = 0
∂U
∂t
(t, x) + αx+
β2
4
− rU + β
2
∂U
∂x
+
(∂U∂x )
2
4
= 0 (6)
It is usual, in regards with the terms of this equation, to look for a solution
with the following form U(t, x) = b(t)x2 + c(t)x+ g(t).
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Replacing in (6) and by identifying the coefficients of the polynomial
gives :
b
′
(t) = −b2(t) + rb(t) (7)
c
′
(t) = −b(t)c(t)− βb(t) + rc(t)− α (8)
g
′
(t) = −c2(t)/4− β/2c(t) + rg(t)− β2/4 (9)
For the solution to be admissible (see the integrand in the maximization
criterion), one must have :
x(t) = x0 +
α+ βr
2r
t (10)
and a(t) = α+βr2r .
Moreover, we know that m(t, x) is solution of :
∂tm(t, x) + a(t)∂xm(t, x) = 0 (11)
m(0, x) = m0(x) (12)
Even this is the simplest transport equation we give the following details for
the reader convenience. First, one can see thatm(t, x(t)) = cte = m(0, x(0)),
indeed
dm(t, x(t))
dt
=
∂m
∂t
+ x
′
(t)
∂m
∂x
=
∂m
∂t
+ a(t)
∂m
∂x
= 0
then (expressing x(0) as a function of x(=x(t))) we find
m(t, x) = m0
(
x− α/r + β
2
t
)
(13)
In this first model, the instantaneous production of each researchers is
constant (da/dt = 0). Each researcher exhibits the same instantaneous sci-
entific production (∂a/∂x = 0) and any initial distribution (and in particular
the Pareto distribution) will be preserved over time while ”traveling” (like
a travelling-wave) with the following velocity : α/r+β2 . At time t, m(t, x) is
thus the translation of m0 by
α/r+β
2 t.
To illustrate graphically this phenomena let us fix the parameters α =
r = 0, 05 and β = 0 and take for m(0, x) a bell-type curve distribution, we
obtain the following graphics (Fig. 1) for the densities at t = 0 and t = 20,
i.e. m(0, x) and m(20, x) :
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Fig. 1
The speed of the wave describes the intensity of the publication activity
of a generation since it compares the stock of publications of the same pool
of researchers at two different dates. It is an increasing function of α and
β and a decreasing function of the researchers’ time preference. Indeed, the
higher this time preference is, the lower is the discounted value of net benefit
of a publication and so the lower is the quantity of publications.
Recall that β is the measure of the direct utility of an extra publication,
in this model αr is the indirect utility of this extra publication through its
impact on the academic resume. As an additional publication increases the
stock of publications at each future date, its discounted value is 1r .
2.2 A model with ranking
This section explicitely introduces the role of ranking in the academic reward
system. The reward of the academic work is rarely strictly tight to the
absolute volume of publication. Instead, most of the remuneration system
rest on the comparative number of works. The objective of any researcher
is to be in the highest possible place in the overall ranking of his peers.
Following Merton (1968, 1969) the goal of a scientist is to be the first
to obtain a particular result, the proof of the priority being given by pub-
lication. The reward to priority is the recognition awarded by the scientific
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community to being first. This phenomenon of giving rewards to priority
is particularly illustrated with Nobel prizes which are given to persons hav-
ing obtained an outstanding result in the first place, however, this is not
limited to Nobel Prizes, but is the rule of the promotion game for every
researchers. Moreover, the competition between researchers is not limited
only to the publication race. Obviously, the process of promotion is the re-
sult of a tournament in which each academic resume is assessed with respect
to others.
Beside, peer recognition within a field is related to one’s ranking in
the academia. For instance, REPEC provides every month a ranking of
the registered authors within one country or a wider geographic country.
Newspapers also give periodically ranking of academic institutions or even
of scientific researchers. Scientific journal publish similar results (Dubois et
al 2010, Courtault et al 2011, Combe et Linemer 2001, Bosquet et al 2010).
To implement the influence of the relative situation of a researcher in a
scientific community, we assume now that the utility function depends on
the ranking of a researcher. This brings an externality into the model which
can be fruitfully studied with Mean Field Games.
One way to choose this dependence is to take the remuneration inversely
proportional to m.7 Indeed, the number of people having achieved a particu-
lar ranking is smaller the higher the ranking. Instead of using the cumulative
distribution function as an index of ranking, it is therefore equivalent and it
will prove easier to use the inverse of the distribution function.
Hence we propose the following model :
max
(at)
{∫ +∞
0
(
α
1
m(t, x(t))
+ βx˙(t)− x˙2(t)
)
e−rtdt/x(0) = x0
}
(14)
where dxt = atdt.
We introduce the value function :
U(t, x) = max(as)
{∫ +∞
t
(
α
1
m(s, x(s))
+ βx˙(s)− x˙2(s)
)
e−rsds/x(t) = x
}
(15)
The Partial Differential Equations system is given by :
∂U
∂t
(t, x) + max
a
{
α
m(t, x)
+ βa(t)− a2(t) + a∂U
∂x
}
− rU = 0 (16)
71/m can be used as a ranking since m is decreasing as we will show that the equilibrium
distribution is a Pareto distribution.
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∂m
∂t
(t, x) +
∂
∂x
(am) = 0 (17)
m(0, x) = m0(x) (18)
The control is given by a = argmax
{
α
m(t,x(t)) + βa(t)− a2(t) + a∂xU
}
=
∂xU+β
2 . Replace this expression in the equations (16) - (17) - (18)
we get :
∂tU(t, x) +
α
m(t, x)
+
1
4
(β + ∂xU)
2 − rU = 0 (19)
∂tm(t, x) + ∂x
(
∂xU + β
2
m
)
= 0 (20)
m(0, x) = m0(x) (21)
We recall that we are interested by the ”persistence” of a Pareto density in
this system, so as explained in the introduction we take m(0, x) = m0(x) =
1
x2
1x>1.
Theorem 2.1. For an initial distribution of researcher given by m(0, x) =
m0(x) =
1
x2
1x>1, the system (19)− (20) admits as solution :
m(t, x) =
α
r t+ 1
(x− β2 t)2
1x>β/2t+α
r
t+1 (22)
U(t, x) =
α
r (x− β2 t)2
α
r t+ 1
+
β2
4r
(23)
the control is given by :
a(t, x) =
α
r (x− β2 t)
α
r t+ 1
+
β
2
(24)
and for the researcher who starts with x0, we find :
x(t) = (
α
r
t+ 1)x0 +
β
2
t. (25)
Proof. Suppose that we are looking for an x(t) in the form x(t) = h(t)x0 +
v(t), then a(t, x) = h
′
(t)x0 + v
′
(t) and the Kolmogorov equation :
∂tm(t, x) +
h
′
(t)
h(t)
m+ a(t, x)∂xm(t, x) = 0 (26)
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h(t)∂tm(t, x) + h
′
(t)m+ a(t, x)h(t)∂xm(t, x) = 0
then for m(0, x) = 1
x2
1x>1, we find m(t, x) =
1
h(t)m(0, (x − v(t))/h(t) =
h(t)
(x−v(t))2 1x>v(t)+h(t). Replacing this expression in (19) gives :
∂tU(t, x) +
α(x− v(t))2
h(t)
1x>v(t)+h(t) +
1
4
(β + ∂xU)
2 − rU = 0 (27)
One can now check that U(t, x) =
α
r
(x−β
2
t)2
α
r
t+1 +
β2
4r is solution of (27) for
v(t) = β2 t and h(t) =
α
r t+ 1. Hence
x(t) = (
α
r
t+ 1)x0 +
β
2
t
and the control
a(t, x) =
α
r (x− β2 t)
α
r t+ 1
+
β
2
,
or in other terms : a(t) = a(t, x(t)) =
α
r
(x(t)−β
2
t)
α
r
t+1 +
β
2 =
α
r x0 +
β
2 .
Note that the solution given in Theorem 2.1 is a static Pareto’s Optimum.
Indeed, any two researchers with initial positions given by x0 and x˜0 have
identical marginal rates of substitution :
∂xU(t1, x(t1)
∂xU(t2, x(t2)
=
α
r
(x(t1)−β2 t1)
α
r
t1+1
α
r
(x(t2)−β2 t2)
α
r
t2+1
=
2αr x0
2αr x0
=
2αr x˜0
2αr x˜0
= 1 (28)
3 Economic interpretation : Impact of the remu-
neration scheme on the density profile
This section studies the impact of the remuneration scheme on the distribu-
tion of the academic production over the continuum of researchers.
Fig. 2 presents the densities m(0, x) and m(5, x) for the parameters
value α = r = 0, 05 and β = 0 :
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Fig. 2
Recall that at date 0, the worst researcher has an academic resume of 1,
at date t, his scientific production will be: x(t) = (αr t+ 1) +
β
2 t.
Fig. 2 illustrates two important features of the distribution over time
: first, for all dates, the distribution of academic resumes is always Pareto
although the law deforms over time. Second, the instantaneous scientific
production of any researcher is constant over time according to a(t) = αr x0+
β
2 . this speed is an increasing function of the initial CV of the researcher.
In order to maintain his initial position, a researcher is induced to produce
accordingly. Over time, the gap between scientific CV of researchers is
growing.
Moreover, the score of publication x(t) and the instantaneous scientific
production a(t) are both increasing functions of α and β, and a decreasing
functions of time preference. However, the consequences of a change in these
parameters are contrasted. An increase in β has the same positive influence
for every researcher, be they bad or good, whereas an increase in α will
foster relatively more the academic production of the best scientists (25).
Similarly, the influence of r is mediated through the initial position.
In order to measure the relative influence on the dispersion of the scien-
tific production, we introduce the following measure:
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F (t, x) =
∫ +∞
x+β
2
t+α
r
t+1
m(t, y)dy (29)
=
∫ +∞
x+β
2
t+α
r
t+1
α
r t+ 1
(y − β2 t)2
1
y>β
2
t+α
r
t+1
dy =
α
r t+ 1
x+ αr t+ 1
(30)
which represents the number of researchers who exhibit an academic
resume over and above the minimum production β2 t +
α
r t + 1 plus an arbi-
trary level x of scientific production.8 We can interpret this measure as the
fraction of outstanding researchers.
One interesting aspect of F (t, x) is that it shows that only the parameter
α influences positively the number of people having an academic resume of
at least x. Instantaneous remuneration β has no influence on this measure.
Although it has an influence on the speed of the wave and hence on the total
productivity of the whole community, the fraction of outstanding researchers
can be increased by a rise in α.
4 conclusion
In this paper, we use the Mean Field Game approach to study the impact
of different types of remunerations over scientific production. One of the
main result of the paper is that of the motivation of Lotka’s law. Indeed we
showed that Pareto’s distribution is persistent. Once we start with a Pareto
distribution for the academic resume, this distribution stays Pareto. How-
ever, the caracteristics of this distribution evolves over time. This result is
achieved through competition among the researchers who aim at maintain-
ing their rank within the distribution. One interesting result of the paper
is that remuneration of ranking with respect to the academic resume influ-
ences both the speed at which the overall distribution moves over time, in the
same way as piecework remuneration do, and more importantly boosts the
productivity of outstanding researchers. In order to achieve these results,
the model had to make some simplifying assumptions. First, we consider
that researchers have an infinite horizon, a more appropriate model should
consider overlapping generations. It is difficult to predict what will be the
exact influence of this assumption on the equilibrium distribution. However,
8Taking the number of researchers exhibiting an academic resume above x only would
not make sense as for any given level x there is a time t for which the proportion of people
exhibiting an academic resume above x is equal to one
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we might guess that the speed at which the equilibrium distribution moves
would slow down as at each period. The older generation of researchers
who have in averaged the most important academic resume is replaced by a
generation of junior researchers having weaker academic achievement. The
ripple effect exerted on the speed of the distribution is more likely to be
reduced. Second our approach oversimplifies the remuneration scheme. For
instance we do not take into account the ratchet effect implied by some
academic procedure such as tenure. Once tenure is acquired, a drop of the
academic production has little impact over remuneration. Besides, we did
not consider either the influence of ranking with respect to the instantaneous
academic production which would allow us to take into account remuner-
ation schemes of the type of the french ”Prime d’Excellence Scientifique”.
Finally, scientific production is not the only output of academic researchers,
the scientific method requires, in fact, that many researchers can devote a
significant part of their research time not to make fundamental discoveries,
but to validate the innovative research and to reveal, through their citations,
the best ideas produced.
Despite these limitations our paper is interesting for at least two rea-
sons. It provides first a theoretical foundation to the empirical stability of
Lotka’s law. Above this, in a period where governments intend to foster
applied and academic research and aim at improving the efficiency of their
research institutions, this paper brings some insight on the effect of various
incentive schemes on scientific production. The Mean Field Game approach
developped here allows to analyze the consequences of competition between
researchers and to underlines the positive effects of the race for the best
ranks both on the volume of scientific production and on the visibility of
the best researchers.
5 Appendix : Resolution of the model without
externalities using variational calculus
It should be noted though that this model can be easily solved using calcu-
lus of variations. Replace a(t) by x˙(t) in the optimization problem (1), it
becomes :
max
(xt)
{∫ +∞
0
(
αx+ βx˙(t)− x˙2(t)) e−rtdt/x(0) = x0}
which can be written as max(xt)
{∫ +∞
0 J(t, x(t), x˙(t))dt/x(0) = x0
}
where
J(t, x, v) =
(
αx+ βv − v2) e−rt. The Euler-Lagrange equation for this prob-
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lem:
d
dt
(
∂J
∂v
) =
∂J
∂x
becomes ddt((β − 2x˙(t))e−rt) = αe−rt, −2x¨(t)− r(β − 2x˙(t)) = α, i.e.
−2x¨(t) + r2x˙(t) = α+ rβ
The homogeneous equation admits a general solution Aert + B. Given the
right hand side of the equation and the fact that we are searching admissible
solution, one must have A = 0, which gives x(t) = x0 +
α+βr
2r t.
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